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a b s t r a c t
Trading in FXmarkets is dominatedby twomicrostructures: exchangeswithmarketmakers
and OTC-markets without market makers. Using laboratory experiments we test whether
the impact of a Tobin tax is different in these twomarketmicrostructures.Weﬁnd that (i) in
markets without market makers an unilaterally imposed Tobin tax (i.e. a tax haven exists)
increases volatility. (ii) In contrast, in markets with market makers we observe a decrease
in volatility in unilaterally taxed markets. (iii) An encompassing Tobin tax has no impact
on volatility in either setting. Efﬁciency does not vary signiﬁcantly across tax regimes.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
. Introduction
The idea of implementing a transaction tax on foreign exchange (FX) markets was ﬁrst circulated by James Tobin in the
arly 1970s as a reaction to the high volatility in FX markets after the fall of the Bretton-Woods system of ﬁxed exchange
ates (Tobin, 1978). He argued that the tremendous increase in trading volume since then hadmainly been due to speculative
ehavior.1 Tobin assumes two archetypes of traders on ﬁnancial markets: stabilizing long-term investors who base their
rades on fundamentals, and short-term speculators who try to detect time trends in prices. Hence, a small transaction
ax would mainly harm the frequently trading speculators who would either leave the market or at least markedly reduce
 We thank Frank Westerhoff and Paolo Pellizzari for very useful comments on earlier versions of this paper. Financial support by the Austrian National
ank (grant 12789), the Austrian Science Fund FWF (grant ZFP220400), the University of Innsbruck (Nachwuchsförderung Kirchler and Doktoranden-
tipendium Kleinlercher) and the Austrian Academy of Science (DOC-fellowship Kleinlercher) is gratefully acknowledged.
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +43 512 507 7579; fax: +43 512 507 2846.
E-mail addresses: michael.kirchler@uibk.ac.at (M. Kirchler), juergen.huber@uibk.ac.at (J. Huber), daniel.kleinlercher@uibk.ac.at (D. Kleinlercher).
1 Galati et al. (2005) report an annual increase of 17% in the daily trading volume on world FX markets from 1973 until 2005.
167-2681 © 2011 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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their trading volume. Consequently, this would lead to a decrease in volatility and to an increase in market efﬁciency, while
potential tax revenues are a “side effect” for Tobin.2 The attitude on the last point has changed in the past few years, at least
among politicians, as during the ﬁnancial crisis 2007–2009 the idea of a Tobin tax has become very popular among them.
The tax seems to target “evil speculators” and promises substantial tax revenues which do not have to be paid (directly) by
the “normal” tax payer/voter.
Scientiﬁc research on the impact of a Tobin tax has started mainly in the 1990s with studies on the more general issue
of how transaction taxes affect ﬁnancial markets.3 There is broad consensus in the literature on some “trivial” issues such
as negative effects of a Tobin tax on trading volume and market shares of taxed markets (compared to untaxed markets, i.e.
tax havens).4
While the direction of the volume effects seems to be clear, other issues, especially the impact of a Tobin tax on volatility
and on market efﬁciency, are still hotly debated, with strong academic backers for both sides. Parts of the controversy
regarding volatility are likely due to different methodological approaches and different model assumptions: the main body
of literature supporting the hypothesis of Tobin relies on agent-based models,5 while studies opposing the hypothesis of
Tobin are mainly empirical, but suffer from the problem that they can only infer the impact of transaction taxes indirectly,
since a Tobin tax has not yet been implemented.6
One common feature of all the papers mentioned so far is that the market microstructure has been ignored. This paper is an
attempt to close this research gap. Currently, global trading in foreign exchange is dominated by two market microstructures:
part of global volume is handled by exchanges where market makers ensure permanent liquidity provision.7 An even larger
share of global volume is traded OTC (over-the-counter) between individual parties without market makers.8 The only paper
to directly address the important market microstructure issues with respect to a Tobin tax is by Pellizzari and Westerhoff
(2009). They use an agent-based model with the chartist/fundamentalist approach and explore the effect of a Tobin tax in
different market microstructures, namely dealership and double-auction markets. They report that liquidity decreases in
reaction to the imposition of a Tobin tax in a double-auction market and thus a given market order has a stronger price
impact. As a consequence the imposition of a Tobin tax does not decrease price volatility, since the stabilizing effect of a
reduction in speculative orders and the destabilizing effect of an increased price impact of orders due to lowered liquidity
offset each other. By implementing a dealership-market with artiﬁcial market makers providing constant liquidity provision,
they ﬁnd that the introduction of a Tobin tax reduces volatility in dealership markets as speculation is reduced. Thus, a Tobin
tax has different effects, depending on the market microstructure.9
Our paper can be understood as a cross-test of agent-based models and laboratory experiments, as we  base our research
question on and compare our results to Pellizzari and Westerhoff (2009).  We implement two important alterations to their
setup by (i) conducting laboratory markets with real humans interacting, and by (ii) implementing trade on two markets (for
the same currency pair) simultaneously, thereby allowing for tax havens. For the experiment we build on and extend the
setup in Hanke et al. (2010).  In particular, we compare the impact of a Tobin tax under different market microstructures in
laboratory markets: in Treatment OTC no market makers are present and thus each human trader can post limit and market
orders. Hence, liquidity evolves endogenously through the actions of the human traders. In Treatment MM computerized
market makers constantly post limit orders irrespective of the tax regime and thus keep liquidity provision constant.
We observe very strong and signiﬁcant differences in the effects of a Tobin tax under different market microstructures:
(i) in markets without market makers (Treatment OTC) an unilaterally imposed Tobin tax (i.e. a tax haven exists) increases
volatility. (ii) In contrast, in markets with market makers (Treatment MM)  an unilaterally imposed Tobin tax decreases
volatility, while (iii) an encompassing Tobin tax has no impact on volatility in either setting. We  do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant
differences in market efﬁciency across tax regimes, as all markets are fairly efﬁcient.
2 For various aspects of the Tobin tax see Haq et al. (1996), Spahn (2002) and Habermeier and Kirilenko (2003).
3 See e.g. Stiglitz (1989),  Summers and Summers (1989), Schwert and Seguin (1993),  Jones and Seguin (1997), Subrahmanyam (1998),  Dow and Rahi
(2000)  and Baltagi et al. (2006).
4 For example, volume fell by one-third after a stamp tax of 0.1 percent was increased to 0.3 percent on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in May  2007. In
Sweden the introduction of a transaction tax of 0.5% in 1984 led to the markets for futures and for bills to dry up almost completely and more than half of
share  trading to move abroad, mostly to London (Umlauf, 1993).
5 See Lux (1998),  Lux and Marchesi (2000) and Hommes (2006) for studies with the chartist/fundamentalist approach (in the spirit of Tobin’s distinction
between speculators and fundamentalists). Already Frankel (1996) speculates that a transaction tax could increase the number of long-term fundamentalists
or  decrease the number of speculators. Either way, the price variability should decrease. More recent contributions by Westerhoff (2003), Ehrenstein et al.
(2005)  and Westerhoff and Dieci (2006) provide further evidence that a Tobin tax drives chartists from the market and stabilizes prices. Instead, with a
different agent-based modelling approach, Mannaro et al. (2008) include a group of random traders and contrarians in addition to fundamentalists and
chartists  and ﬁnd a positive (negative) impact of a Tobin tax on volatility (trading volume).
6 See e.g. Aliber et al. (2003), Habermeier and Kirilenko (2003) and Hau (2006).
7 At the CME  and the LIFFE some currency pairs in their future markets are traded with market makers. In general, the importance of market makers has
slightly decreased during the last years.
8 In this market microstructure big institutional investors (e.g., banks, large companies) trade currencies directly with each other without market makers.
The  biggest electronic trading platforms are EBS and Reuters 3000 XTRA.
9 A negative relationship of market liquidity and the price impact of orders has already been claimed by Ehrenstein et al. (2005), Lillo and Farmer (2005)
and  Mannaro et al. (2008).  Ehrenstein et al. (2005) and Mannaro et al. (2008) further argue that transaction taxes probably have a negative impact on
market liquidity, hinting at increased volatility when liquidity drops, since the price impact of orders increases.
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The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present the market model and experimental design. Sections 3 and 4
eport the econometric model and the results, respectively. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper by relating our results to
revious studies and by discussing the practical implications of our results.
. Experimental setup and procedure
The setup of the experiment follows the one presented in Hanke et al. (2010),  who explore the effects of a Tobin tax in one
r both of two continuous double-auction markets. As a useful preliminary, we  provide the following deﬁnitions. A market
s a sequence of 10 trading periods for the currencies A and B. A session consists of 2 markets (LEFT and RIGHT), in which
raders can act on both markets simultaneously.10 A tax rate scenario deﬁnes when and on which markets within a session
 two-way Tobin tax is imposed (possibilities LEFT, LEFT and RIGHT, no tax on both markets). A treatment consists of 6 tax
ate scenarios (with 2 sessions in Treatment OTC and 4 sessions in Treatment MM for each tax rate scenario). With all other
hings equal, Treatment OTC uses a double-auction market architecture, whereas Treatment MM is set up as a dealership
arket with computerized market makers posting limit orders.
.1. Market setup
In each session a different cohort of 16 (Treatment OTC) or 8 (Treatment MM)  human subjects trade currency A for
urrency B on two markets (denoted LEFT and RIGHT and placed accordingly on the screen; see screenshot in Appendices
 and B). Both markets are displayed on the trading screen at the same time and traders can be active on both markets
imultaneously. Buying a currency on one market and selling it on the other is possible, as is buying on both markets or
elling on both markets.
The fundamental value of A (expressed in units of B) is modelled as a geometric Brownian motion without drift:
FVk = FVk−1 · ek . (1)
Vk denotes the fundamental value in period k and k is a normally distributed random variable with a mean of zero and
 standard deviation of 5%. FV0 is set to 60. We  draw one fundamental value path randomly (path I) and its counterpart
irrored at the unconditional expected value of FV is used as path II. For each tax rate scenario in Treatment OTC (MM)  two
four) sessions are run, one (two) with path I, the other with path II.
For the sake of simplicity we introduce a symmetric information structure where at the beginning of each period each
ubject receives a private signal (SIGNAL) on the fundamental value of currency A. This signal is calculated as the FV plus a
oise term with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 2.5%. Estimation errors cancel out across subjects in each period
o ensure that “the market” has an unbiased estimate of the FV.11
In each session half of the subjects are initially endowed with 75 A and 1500 B. The other half starts with 25 A and 4500
. Given an initial fundamental value FV0 of 60 B per A each trader’s initial wealth is 6000 in currency B. The holdings in A
nd B are carried over from one period to the next and going short up to 100 (6000) units of currency A (B) is possible.12 Any
rder size and the partial execution of limit orders is possible as long as the endowments in A and B are above −100 and
6000, respectively. Order books are emptied, i.e. all orders deleted, before the beginning of a new period. To keep things
imple there are no interest payments on holdings in either currency.
.2. Tax rate scenarios
The tax rate scenarios shown in Table 1 differ with respect to when and on which markets a (two-way) Tobin tax of 0.1%
f the transaction value (price in B multiplied by units of A traded) is levied.
In particular, each session consists of two phases p of 5 periods each. Hence, the treatment abbreviations in Table 1 are
o be read as follows: the numbers “0” and “2” specify whether no market (“0”) or both markets (“2”) are taxed in a given
hase. If only one market is taxed, we chose to tax only the left market (“L”) to reduce the number of possible scenarios. In
his case the right market is always the tax haven.13
Before the beginning of the ﬁrst and the sixth period subjects are informed about the imposition of a tax with an announce-
ent screen. This screen outlines in detail which markets are taxed and provides a calculation example for taxation. Subjects
o not get any information about the potential implementation of transaction taxes before the main experiment starts and
10 We  consciously chose generic currencies and places to avoid possible inﬂuences due to preferences of subjects.
11 This was implemented by drawing positive estimation errors for half of the subjects and using the respective negative error terms for the other half of
ubjects.
12 Theoretically this would allow bankruptcy of a subject. However, with the limit on short selling this would require a subject to take the maximum loan,
uy  the asset at very high prices, followed by a price drop by one half. This did never occur and no subject came close to bankruptcy.
13 For instance, in tax rate scenario L2 the tax is introduced only on market LEFT in the ﬁrst ﬁve periods and is levied also on the RIGHT market in periods
–10.  Hanke et al. (2010) already provide evidence on the impact of a tax on the LEFT and on the RIGHT market.
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Table  1
Tax rate scenarios in each treatment.
Tax rate scenario Periods 1–5 Periods 6–10
LEFT RIGHT LEFT RIGHT
0L – – 0.1% –
02  – – 0.1% 0.1%
L0  0.1% – – –
L2  0.1% – 0.1% 0.1%
20 0.1%  0.1% – –
2L 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% –
Entries show the two-way tax rate (0.1% for each side) for taxed markets. Dashes indicate the absence of taxes. In Treatment OTC (MM)  two  (four) sessions
are  run for each tax rate scenario.
they are not informed whether and when the tax regime is changed again. Furthermore, the tax rate is also placed on the
trading screen once a tax has been introduced.14
2.3. Experimental treatments
We  ran 12 (24) sessions with 16 human (8 human subjects and 2 computerized agents) traders each in Treatment
OTC (MM).15 The main experiment lasted 10 periods of 4 min  each.16 To avoid strategic behavior towards the end of the
experiment, subjects were told that the experiment will end between periods 8 and 14 with equal probability. At the end
of the experiment all units of A were bought back at the fundamental value of the last period. Therefore, the ﬁnal wealth
comprised the value of the holdings in A (units of A multiplied by the fundamental value of the last period) plus the holdings
in B and is converted into EUR at an exchange rate of 1 EUR = 400 Taler. All these were public knowledge. All 384 subjects
were business students at the University of X, recruited with ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).17 Sessions were computerized (using
zTree 3.2.8 by Fischbacher, 2007) and lasted about 90 min.
2.3.1. Treatment 1: over-the-counter – OTC
Subjects trade in a continuous double auction market and are able to post limit and market orders. Limit orders are
executed according to price and then time priority.18 Market orders have priority over limit orders and are always executed
instantaneously.19 The order books are open which means that all limit orders are immediately visible to all subjects.
2.3.2. Treatment 2: market maker – MM
Treatment MM deviates from Treatment OTC in one crucial aspect: subjects are not able to post limit orders, as those are
provided by market makers. To achieve a constant liquidity inﬂow we  implement one computerized market maker in each
market (similar to Pellizzari and Westerhoff, 2009).20 Every several seconds (see process and parameters below) a market
maker places both a bid and an ask at the same time t:
BIDk,t = Pk,t − |εk,t | + ık,t,
ASKk,t = Pk,t + |εk,t | + ık,t .
(2)
Here Pk,t denotes the last transaction price at time t in period k and |εk,t| is the absolute value of a standard normally
distributed random variable. Hence, the bids and asks of a market maker mostly dependent on the last transaction price,
since he places a bid and an ask with a spread of 2|εk,t| with the same εk,t on each side of the current market price. Thus, if
prices go up (through excess demand of the experimental subjects), market makers quickly incorporate this in their bids and
asks. Note that they process no fundamental information. Market efﬁciency will thus be determined solely by the actions of
human subjects. Market makers have no constraints on how many units of A and B they can hold, but in real markets they
usually try to keep their long- and short-positions balanced, i.e. have a net exposure of zero. We  therefore add a parameter
14 Our treatments are balanced in the following way: with two  market phases (periods 1–5 and 6–10) and three tax regimes, we achieve a perfectly
randomized structure, since we can implement all possible permutations of “0”, “2”, and “L”. Hence, these three tax regimes show up equally often in the
ﬁrst  and in the second half within all sessions of a treatment. This offers the big advantage that possible time trends in the data due to learning effects play
hardly  any role.
15 As subjects did not have to post limit orders in MM,  we reduced the number of human traders to 8 to achieve better comparability to Treatment OTC.
It  turned out that trading volumes were very similar across the two  treatments. To have the same number of humans in each treatment we doubled the
number of sessions we  ran for MM.
16 Before trading started subjects had 15 min  to read written instructions. Questions were answered privately. Then the trading screen was  explained and
two  trial periods (not relevant for the payout) were conducted to allow subjects to become familiar with the trading screen and the trading procedure (see
Appendices A and B for the trading screen and the experimental instructions).
17 Given their curriculum they know about standard deviations and stochastic processes which were used to model the FV.
18 Traders have to specify price and quantity they want to trade for with the risk that the limit order will not be accepted by another trader.
19 Traders only have to specify the quantity they want to trade for with immediate execution at the price of the best limit order in the market.
20 We  chose computerized market makers rather than human market makers as the former guarantee a constant ﬂow of liquidity to the market.
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Table 2
Formulae for the calculation of variables.
Measure Calculation
Normalized trading volume VOLNORM
s,m,k
= (VOLs,m,k − VOLs)/VOLs
Normalized returns (tick data) RETNORM
s,m,i
= (RETs,m,i − RETs)/RETs
Acceptance ratio ACCRATIOs,m,k = MOs,m,k/LOs,m,k
Relative absolute deviationa RADs,m,k =
∣
∣Ps,m,k − FVs,m,k
∣
∣/
∣
FVs
∣
Normalized tax revenues TAXREVNORM
s,m,k
= (TAXREVs,m,k − TAXREVs)/TAXREVs
s, session; m, market; k, period; i, trades.
VOLs,m,k = units of currency A traded in period k; VOLs = average trading volume per period of currency A in session s; VOLs =
standard deviation of all trading volumes per period of currency A in session s; RETs,m,i = ln(Ps,m,i) − ln(Ps,m,i−1); Ps,m,i = trading price of trade i;
RETs = average of all returns (RET) in session s; RETs = standard deviation of all returns (RET) in session s; MOs,m,k = number of market orders;
LOs,m,k = number of limit orders. Ps,m,k = (volume-weighted) mean price;  FVs,m,k = fundamental value; FVs = average fundamental value of the session;
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fAXREVs,m,k = tax revenues in currency B in period k; TAXREVs = average tax revenues per period in currency B in session s; TAXREVs =
tandard deviation of all tax revenues per period in currency B in session s;.
a Stöckl et al. (2010).
k,t to ensure that the market maker has a tendency to keep his net holdings in A close to his initial endowment A0 of zero.
k,t is calculated as (Ak,t −A0)/(|Ak,t − A0|) · (− |Ak,t − A0|)/100 which reduces to −Ak,t/100 with Ak,t (A0) denoting the holdings
n currency A at time t of period k (at the beginning of the experiment). If, for example, his holdings in A are 20 units below
he initial holdings A0, he adds 0.2 to the bid and the ask to make his bids more attractive for subjects to accept and to sell.
onsequently, the further away the current holdings in A are from the initial holdings the more aggressively a market maker
ries to bring his holdings in A back to a net position of zero.
In order to mimic  the order ﬂow generated in market phases with both markets being untaxed in Treatment OTC, 90%
f the generated limit orders are posted between 1 and 23 s after the previous order was  posted (with a mean of 7.2 s). The
istribution of this stochastic “waiting time” is drawn from a Weibull-distribution.21 For the quantity posted with each limit
rder a Poisson-distribution with a mean of 4.5 units of A ﬁts the distribution in Treatment OTC best. Parameter  is half the
verage limit order size in all periods with tax regime “0” in Treatment OTC.22
Thus, the eight human traders in each session of Treatment MM are provided with a limit order ﬂow very similar to
ntaxed markets in Treatment OTC. While the order ﬂow (liquidity) by humans in Treatment OTC is likely to change after
he introduction of a tax, this is not the case in Treatment MM,  where the order ﬂow is independent of the tax regime applied.
his offers the advantage that we can measure the impact of a transaction tax on trader behavior when liquidity provision
s held constant. However, it also means that some results need to be interpreted with caution, as in real markets market
akers may  change their order ﬂow as a reaction to the tax.23
. Deﬁnition of variables and econometric model
We use the following panel regression model:
ym,p =  ˛ + ˇ1TT encompassingm,p + ˇ2TT unilateralm,p + ˇ3Tax havenm,p + εm,p. (4)
ere, ym,p is a generic placeholder for the dependent variables explained below, m indicates cross-section (market) and
 phase (i.e. ﬁve consecutive periods in which a certain tax regime was applied). TT encompassing equals 1 when both
arkets are taxed, zero otherwise. TT unilateral is a binary dummy  to deﬁne unilaterally taxed markets with the other
arket being taxed and Tax haven is a binary dummy  for the tax haven. Consequently, intercept  ˛ represents the tax regime
n which both markets are untaxed. Importantly, we apply clustered standard errors on a session level to allow for correlation
ithin sessions and independence of observations between sessions. In particular, we implement the “vce(cluster varname)”
ethod in STATA in all panel regressions in this paper.
Table 2 provides formulae for the dependent variables used in this paper: normalized trading volume, normalized returns,
cceptance ratio (measure for trading behavior), relative absolute deviation (measure for market efﬁciency) and normalized
21 We  apply a Weibull-distribution, since this distribution best ﬁts empirically observed waiting times between consecutive limit orders and trades (Engle
nd  Russell, 1998; Politi and Scalas, 2008). In particular,
WTLO = (− ln(X))1/c (3)
rovides us with a weibullian-distributed random variable with X being a uniformly distributed random variable in the range zero to one,  standing for
he  scale parameter (the average of waiting times in all periods with a tax regime of “0” in Treatment OTC), and c indicating the shape parameter of the
istribution.  is set to 6.0 and c is approximated with 0.87, which is very close to the empirically observed shape parameter in Politi and Scalas (2008).
22 As market makers post a bid and an ask simultaneously, the quantity posted with each limit order of the market makers has to be half the quantity
ompared to OTC.
23 We  searched for empirical papers on reactions to tax changes by real-world market makers, but were not able to ﬁnd any. Here is clearly potential for
uture  research.
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Fig. 1. Descriptive statistics. Averages per phase of the dependent variables conditional on treatment and tax regime. VOLNORM (normalized trading volume),
SDRETNORM (standard deviation of normalized returns), ACCRATIO (acceptance ratio – market orders divided by limit orders) and RAD (relative absolute
deviation of prices compared to fundamentals). no Tax: both markets untaxed, Tax hav: this market untaxed, but other market taxed, TT uni: this market
taxed, but other market untaxed, TT enc: both markets taxed.
tax revenues. We  normalize trading volume (VOLNORM) by the mean and the standard deviation of trading volume in each
session s to avoid idiosyncratic impacts of individual sessions, since trading volumes differ by a factor of more than three
between sessions.24 As one can see from Table 2 the respective means and standard deviations are calculated from period
data. To arrive at normalized volume of phase p of market m the average of the respective ﬁve period values is calculated. A
similar approach is applied for the volatility measure, standard deviation of normalized returns (SDRETNORM). Log-returns,
RETs,m,i, with i denoting transaction, are normalized by the mean and the standard deviation in each session (see the discussion
in Plerou et al., 1999 on the importance of normalizing returns from different observations). The standard deviation of these
normalized returns in each market phase serves as dependent variable. Hence, independent observations with differences
in the absolute level of volatility are easily comparable. ACCRATIO is calculated as the number of market orders divided by
the number of limit orders. This variable is a proxy for the cautiousness of traders to accept limit orders, since low values
hint at a very careful execution of market orders and a trend towards limit orders to gain the bid-ask spread. This behavior
is especially expected in taxed markets, since the tax adds to the bid-ask spread as additional transaction costs. Note that
ACCRATIO can be higher than 1 in cases where many small market orders are placed and thus partial execution of limit
orders happens quite frequently. Beside tax revenues (TAXREVNORM) where we  normalize the tax revenues (in currency B)
by the mean and the standard deviation of tax revenues in each session, relative absolute deviation (RAD) completes the
set of variables. It serves as measure for mispricing and is the absolute difference between mean prices per period and the
respective FVs, benchmarked at the average FV in the market (see Stöckl et al., 2010). Hence, the higher RAD, the stronger
is mispricing and the lower is market efﬁciency. For the variables VOLNORM, ACCRATIO,  TAXREVNORM, and RAD period values
are calculated ﬁrst and the mean per phase p and market m is used in the regression.
4. Results
We observe very active trading in our markets, with an average of 764 transactions per session in Treatment OTC and 812
in Treatment MM.  This is on average roughly one transaction every 3 s. Average trading volume per session is 1712 units of
A in Treatment OTC, and 1314 in Treatment MM,  which means that each unit of A is turned over 2.1 (3.3) times in OTC (MM).
Fig. 1 presents the respective averages of normalized trading volume, volatility, acceptance ratio and market efﬁciency. The
left four bars of each panel show data for Treatment OTC, the right four bars Treatment MM.
The ﬁrst panel on the top left presents data on normalized trading volume VOLNORM. Here one observes that trading
volume increases markedly in both treatments in the Tax havens (second bar) and falls even more in the unilaterally taxed
24 With an average trading volume of 1712 units of A in OTC the standard deviation is 1021, and thus very high, which necessitates the normalization to
ensure an equal weight/impact of each session in the aggregate data.
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Table 3
Panel regression for both treatments.
VOLNORM SDRETNORM ACCRATIO RAD TAXREVNORM
OTC MM OTC MM OTC MM OTC MM OTC MM
TT encompassing −0.257 −0.252 −0.078 −0.064 −0.129 −0.109** −0.017 0.005 −0.329 −0.180
(−0.999) (−1.326) (−0.546) (−0.771) (−1.458) (−2.036) (−1.198) (0.975) (−1.120) (−0.640)
TT  unilateral −1.227*** −0.815*** 0.561** −0.357*** −0.223* −0.192*** 0.008 0.013 −1.247*** −1.106***
(−6.109) (−4.915) (1.969) (−4.240) (−1.814) (−3.717) (0.571) (1.494) (−6.060) (−5.040)
Tax  haven 1.027*** 0.334* −0.111 0.247** 0.115* 0.049 −0.004 0.013
(4.746) (1.754) (−1.084) (2.184) (1.669) (0.866) (−0.400) (1.375)
˛ 0.119 0.164 0.987*** 0.917*** 1.031*** 0.598*** 0.058*** 0.048*** 0.155 0.132
(0.800)  (1.525) (15.982) (14.616) (10.176) (10.921) (3.219) (10.522) (0.950) (0.860)
N  48 96 48 96 48 96 48 96 48 96
Dependent variables: VOLNORM (normalized trading volume), SDRETNORM (standard deviation of normalized returns), ACCRATIO (acceptance ratio – market
orders  divided by limit orders), RAD (relative absolute deviation of prices compared to fundamentals), and TAXREVNORM (normalized tax revenues). z-Values
are  given in parentheses. TT encompassing: both markets taxed; TT unilateral: this market taxed, but other market untaxed; Tax haven: this market
untaxed, but other market taxed.
* 10% signiﬁcance level of a double-sided test.
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arkets (third bar). When an encompassing Tobin tax is implemented, trading volume decreases, but not dramatically
fourth bar). The effects seem to be stronger in Treatment OTC than in MM.
The level of volatility, measured by the standard deviation of normalized returns, is presented in the top right panel.
hile volatility is unchanged in both treatments when both markets are untaxed (ﬁrst bar) compared to both being taxed
fourth bar), the unilateral introduction of a Tobin tax strongly increases volatility in Treatment OTC, but markedly decreases
t in Treatment MM (third bar). The opposite holds for the Tax haven (second bar), where volatility decreases slightly in OTC,
ut increases in MM.
The bottom left panel presents data on the acceptance ratio. Here we  see similar patterns (highest ratios when there is no
ax and in the Tax haven, markedly lower ratios in single- or double-taxed markets), but at different levels: the acceptance
atio in Treatment MM is only roughly half the number in Treatment OTC. This is due to the fact that the computerized
arket makers in MM always post a bid and an ask simultaneously (with on average half the volume of the human traders
n OTC), thus there are roughly two times as many orders in this treatment than in OTC.
Market efﬁciency, measured by RAD and shown in the bottom right panel, does not vary much across treatments and tax
egimes. With values between 4.0 and 6.5 percent average deviation from the respective fundamental values, efﬁciency was
uite high in all tax regimes.
Short selling, while allowed up to 100 percent of the initial total endowment (A and B combined), is not excessively used.
verall only 10.4 percent of subjects have short-positions in Treatment MM at the end of a period, while the number is
igher at 19.2 percent in OTC. In both treatments short positions in currency A are more common than in currency B. For
hose subjects which hold short positions at the end of a period, the position is on average −2150 in B (up to −6000 possible)
nd −29 in A (−100 possible). Thus, the possibility to go short is used in only one-tenth to one-ﬁfth of cases, and when it
s used on average one third of the possible maximum is used. On average only 3–6 percent of the initial holdings were
horted.
After these descriptive statistics we now turn to the detailed econometric analysis provided in Tables 3 and 4 . In the
ormer table results of the panel regression according to Eq. (4) are shown, while the latter provides results of a pairwise
ann–Whitney U-test which serves as a non-parametric robustness check.
.1. Trading volume and liquidity
Focussing on normalized trading volume (VOLNORM) in Table 3, we  ﬁnd that trading volume drops, though not signiﬁcantly,
hen a tax is introduced in both markets (TT encompassing) compared to double-untaxed markets (intercept ˛) in both
reatments. This is in line with Hanke et al. (2010),  where the tax rate is ﬁve times as high in most of their treatments. Also
omparable to Hanke et al. (2010),  when the tax is introduced in only one market (TT unilateral), the drop is highly signiﬁcant
n both treatments, while trading volume in the untaxed market (Tax haven) increases signiﬁcantly in both treatments (with
he effect being stronger in OTC).
Turning to differences between the two treatments one can see that most effects of an unilateral imposition of a Tobin
ax are weaker in MM than in OTC. Thus, the market microstructure clearly has an inﬂuence on the effects a Tobin tax has
n markets. The main reason is that the constant order ﬂow in MM ensures enough liquidity in the form of limit orders to
acilitate trade. Due to the design, there are no signiﬁcant differences in the number of limit orders across tax regimes in
reatment MM.  In Treatment OTC, however, liquidity varies signiﬁcantly across tax regimes, with an average of 190 and
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Table  4
Robustness checks for the dependent variables. Pairwise Mann–Whitney U-tests (z-values and p-values in parenthesis are provided).
OTC TT unilateral TT encompassing Tax haven
VOLNORM
no tax 3.797*** 1.319 −3.246***
(0.000) (0.187) (0.001)
TT  unilateral −3.858*** −3.361***
(0.000) (0.001)
TT encompassing −3.552***
(0.000)
MM TT unilateral TT encompassing Tax haven
VOLNORM
no tax 3.302*** 1.423 −0.186
(0.001) (0.155) (0.853)
TT  unilateral −2.176** −2.978***
(0.030) (0.003)
TT  encompassing −1.345
(0.179)
OTC  TT unilateral TT encompassing Tax haven
SDRETNORM
no tax −2.205** 1.055 1.408
(0.028) (0.291) (0.159)
TT  unilateral 2.572** 2.415**
(0.010) (0.016)
TT encompassing −0.367
(0.713)
MM  TT unilateral TT encompassing Tax haven
SDRETNORM
no tax 3.674*** 1.047 −2.865***
(0.000) (0.295) (0.004)
TT  unilateral −3.390*** −4.183***
(0.001) (0.000)
TT  encompassing −3.630***
(0.000)
OTC  TT unilateral TT encompassing Tax haven
ACCRATIO
no tax 1.653* 1.394 −1.470
(0.098) (0.163) (0.142)
TT unilateral −0.551 −2.415**
(0.582) (0.016)
TT  encompassing −2.694***
(0.007)
MM  TT unilateral TT encompassing Tax haven
ACCRATIO
no tax 2.909*** 1.611 −0.634
(0.004) (0.107) (0.526)
TT  unilateral −1.597 −2.902***
(0.110) (0.004)
TT  encompassing −1.990**
(0.047)
OTC  TT unilateral TT encompassing Tax haven
RAD
no tax −0.674 0.339 −0.674
(0.500) (0.735) (0.500)
TT  unilateral 1.225 0.630
(0.220) (0.529)
TT  encompassing −1.041
(0.298)
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Table 4 Continued
MM TT unilateral TT encompassing Tax haven
RAD
no tax −0.678 −1.370 −0.328
(0.498) (0.171) (0.743)
TT  unilateral −0.525 0.0380
(0.600) (0.970)
TT  encompassing 0.547
(0.585)
OTC TT unilateral TT encompassing Tax haven
TAXREVNORM
no tax 3.858*** 1.432 −2.756***
(0.000) (0.152) (0.006)
TT  unilateral −3.429*** −3.361***
(0.001) (0.001)
TT encompassing −3.368***
(0.001)
MM TT  unilateral TT encompassing Tax haven
TAXREVNORM
no tax 4.265*** 1.034 −2.843***
(0.000) (0.301) (0.005)
TT  unilateral −4.112*** −4.598***
(0.000) (0.000)
TT encompassing −3.368***
(0.001)
VOLNORM (normalized trading volume), SDRETNORM (standard deviation of normalized returns), ACCRATIO (acceptance ratio – market orders divided by limit
orders), RAD (relative absolute deviation of prices compared to fundamentals), and TAXREVNORM (normalized tax revenues). no tax: both markets untaxed;
TT  encompassing: both markets taxed; TT unilateral: this market taxed, but other market untaxed; Tax haven: this market untaxed, but other market
taxed.
* 10% signiﬁcance level of a double-sided test.
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95 limit orders per phase and market when both markets are untaxed and both markets are taxed (TT encompassing),
espectively. Only 92 limit orders are posted in unilaterally taxed markets (TT unilateral) in each phase on average, as
iquidity moves to the tax haven, where we observe an average of 267 limit orders per phase.25
.2. Volatility
One of the most important, but also most evasive and controversial issues surrounding the Tobin tax is the development
f volatility in taxed markets. The ﬁrst – rather surprising – result is that volatility is not signiﬁcantly affected by an encom-
assing Tobin tax in both treatments. We  attribute this to the relatively small changes the tax triggers in trading volume
nd order ﬂow in both treatments.
However, when the tax is introduced in only one market we  observe that the standard deviation of normalized returns
SDRETNORM) develops differently in the two microstructures: volatility increases signiﬁcantly in unilaterally taxed markets
TT unilateral) in Treatment OTC, but decreases signiﬁcantly in the respective markets in Treatment MM compared to double-
ntaxed markets. The former runs counter, the latter is in line with the hypothesis of Tobin. This result merits a deeper
nalysis. As we ﬁnd it is mainly a consequence of order ﬂow, i.e. limit orders posted in the market. In MM the order ﬂow
s unaffected by the tax, i.e. the computerized market makers post as many limit orders as before. However, as human
ubjects in tax regime TT unilateral submit fewer market orders (see development of trading volume), orderbooks become
ery liquid (large number of limit orders in the order book), and as a consequence the price impact of market orders and
hus volatility decrease. By contrast, in Treatment OTC human subjects submit fewer limit orders in the unilaterally taxed
arket (92 limit orders per phase compared to 190 when both markets are untaxed) and a large share of liquidity shifts tohe untaxed market (where on average 267 limit orders are posted), with the result of unilaterally taxed markets becoming
elatively illiquid. Trading volume and the number of market orders posted decrease as well and thus the few transactions
hat are carried out have a stronger price impact and lead to comparatively high volatility in unilaterally taxed markets. One
25 We  apply a panel regression according to Eq. (4) with the number of limit orders being the dependent variable. The increase (decrease) in tax regime
ax haven (TT unilateral) is signiﬁcant on the 1%-level.
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last ﬁnding we want to mention: volatility increases in the tax haven in Treatment MM due to the strong shift of trading
activities to this market in combination with constant liquidity.
4.3. Trading behavior
ACCRATIO is the number of market orders divided by the number of limit orders which serves as a proxy for the cau-
tiousness of subjects to accept posted limit orders. In Treatment MM this ratio is driven solely by the number of market
orders placed by subjects, as liquidity provision is kept constant on both markets. As subjects mainly trade on the tax
haven (Tax haven), ACCRATIO in the unilaterally taxed market decreases signiﬁcantly compared to when both markets are
untaxed.
By contrast, in Treatment OTC also the limit order ﬂow is affected by a tax. In taxed markets subjects are more cautious and
so accept fewer limit orders. Hence, ACCRATIO decreases in markets with an unilateral tax (TT unilateral), while it increases
in the Tax haven (Tax haven).
4.4. Market efﬁciency
Turning to market efﬁciency, which we measure by relative absolute deviation (RAD), we ﬁnd that it is not signiﬁ-
cantly affected by a Tobin tax in any of the treatments. This result from the regression of Table 4 is supported by pairwise
Mann–Whitney U-tests (see Table 4) which all deliver p-values above 0.20. This result differs from Hanke et al. (2010),  who
ﬁnd lower efﬁciency in an unilaterally taxed market. We  attribute this to the high level of efﬁciency we  observe throughout
the experiment. With average RADs of 5.8 and 4.8 percent in OTC and MM,  respectively, the deviations from the fundamental
values are never very large.
4.5. Tax revenues
The development of tax revenues (TAXREVNORM) mainly depends on the development of trading volume. As trading
volume reduction is stronger in unilaterally taxed markets of Treatment OTC, the negative effect on tax revenues there is
nearly two times stronger than in Treatment MM (compared to hypothetical tax revenues in periods where both markets
are untaxed). Looking at non-normalized data we ﬁnd that tax revenues are more than 40% higher in unilaterally taxed
markets in Treatment MM than in Treatment OTC. Only when an encompassing Tobin tax is imposed (TT encompassing) tax
revenues are substantial.
5. Conclusion and discussion
We examined the effect the introduction of a Tobin tax had in laboratory markets which were set up either as OTC-
markets or as dealership markets where computerized market makers (MM)  provided limit orders and thus liquidity
provision irrespective of the tax regime applied. The main ﬁndings of the paper are on the controversial issue of volatility:
(i) in markets without market makers an unilaterally imposed Tobin tax increased volatility. (ii) In contrast, in markets
with market makers an unilaterally imposed Tobin tax decreased volatility, while (iii) an encompassing Tobin tax had no
impact on volatility in either setting. In particular, the mechanisms of the results were mainly due to different ﬂows of liq-
uidity in both treatments: in markets of Treatment OTC an unilaterally introduced Tobin tax decreased trading volume
and the number of limit orders signiﬁcantly, leading to lower orderbook liquidity, an increased price impact of mar-
ket orders and thus higher volatility. By contrast, in unilaterally taxed markets in Treatment MM  subjects traded less as
well. In combination with the constant order ﬂow provided by the computerized market makers, this lead to highly liq-
uid orderbooks, a decrease in the price impact of market orders and thus lower volatility. At the same time volatility
increased in the tax haven due to increased trading activity in combination with a constant level of liquidity provision.
Trading volume decreased much less than in markets with an unilateral Tobin tax and hence tax revenues were substan-
tial.
Thus, from the perspective of volatility, Treatment OTC stands in contrast to the hypothesis of Tobin and supports
most empirical studies on transaction taxes (e.g. Aliber et al., 2003; Habermeier and Kirilenko, 2003; Hau, 2006). Instead,
Treatment MM is in line with Tobin’s conjectures and supports many agent-based studies on transaction taxes (e.g.
Frankel, 1996; Westerhoff, 2003; Ehrenstein et al., 2005; Westerhoff and Dieci, 2006). We  also report similar, mostly
even more pronounced effects compared to Pellizzari and Westerhoff (2009).  The most likely reason for the less pro-
nounced results in their double-auction setting is that they do not allow for tax avoidance by implementing only one
market. As agents cannot shift volume to another market, their “liquidity effect” is probably weaker and hence volatil-
ity remains almost unaffected. Thus, following the results of Pellizzari and Westerhoff (2009) and our ﬁndings, future
research on the Tobin tax should take into account the strong impact of market microstructure, especially for volatil-
ity.
When trying to relate our results to real FX markets, we have to acknowledge the limitations of our laboratory markets,
as especially Treatment MM was set up with very basic computerized market makers. Also, as with any experimental study,
the size of the data-set is limited and we have to keep in mind that we operate in stylized markets. However, if even such
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imple markets where few subjects with comparatively low incentives trade deliver strong and robust results (e.g. strong
ax avoidance, increased volatility in humans-only-markets), we  are conﬁdent that these results translate well to larger
arkets where the stakes are much higher and subjects thus more eager to ﬁnd “optimal” responses to tax regime changes.
hus, we think the results are clear and robust enough to state that (i) markets with market makers (MM)  could lead to
he desired outcome of Tobin (i.e. lower volatility as high-frequency traders trade less than before) when it can be assured
hat liquidity provision is hardly affected by the tax. This ﬁnding is remarkable as it would be beneﬁcial for governments
o impose a Tobin tax on such markets even without international coordination, since an unilateral imposition lowers
olatility without affecting efﬁciency. Furthermore, (ii) no matter which microstructure is applied, an encompassing Tobin
ax would not increase volatility or affect efﬁciency and would raise substantial tax revenues if introduced on all major
arkets.
ppendix A. Instruction for Treatment OTC
ackground of the experiment
In this experiment on currency trading 16 traders can trade currency A and currency B (B is the home currency) in two
ndependent markets (called LEFT and RIGHT).
arket properties
Initial endowment: Half of the traders start with 75 units A and 1500 units B, while the other half of the traders start with
25 units A and 4500 units B.
There are two markets where the currencies can be traded – markets LEFT and RIGHT.
No interest is paid on any currency.
The prices in the two markets can deviate.
undamental value of currency A
The fundamentally justiﬁed value – fundamental value need not equal the price – of currency A (expressed in units of
urrency B) is the value that would result from a full and fair analysis of the currency. In reality it depends on micro- and
acroeconomic variables. In our market the fundamental value of A (expressed in units of B) is modelled as a stochastic
rocess:
FVk = FVk−1 · ek .
here FVk stands for the fundamental value in period k and k is a normally distributed random variable with a mean of zero
nd a standard deviation of 5%. The fundamental value in the current period it thus the best estimate of the fundamental
alue in the next period.
nformation on the fundamental value of currency A
Each period each subject receives a private signal (SIGNAL) on the fundamental value of currency A (expressed in units of
urrency B). This signal can be above or below the actual fundamental value with equal probability. Most signals are close to
he true fundamental value, as only an error term with an expected value of zero and a standard deviation of 2.5% is added
o the fundamental value.
alculating total wealth
Your total wealth (expressed in units of B) comprised the value of your holdings in A (units of A multiplied by the last
rice) plus the holdings of B. For valuing A the last price is used.
Wealth = (units A × price A)  + units B
If prices in the two markets deviate, the current price with the higher trading volume is used.
mportant detailsEach trading period lasts 240 s, i.e. 4 min.
The experiment lasts between 8 and 14 periods with equal termination probability in each period.
Your payment in Euro depends on your total wealth at the end of the experiment. Your holdings of A
will be valued at their fundamental value (not price!) of the last period. The ﬁnal payment is calculated as
follows:
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Final wealth = (units A × fundamental value) + units B
Payment = Final wealth
400
Example: units A: 30, fundamental value of A: 70, units B: 3900.
Final wealth = (30 × 70) + 3900 = 6000
Payment = 6000
400
= 15 Euro
The trading screen looks as follows:
Trading
• All subjects can buy and sell currencies at any time. This can be done on the LEFT or RIGHT market – switching between
markets is free and causes no extra costs. Short selling (negative holdings) is possible up to an amount of −100 A and
−6.000 B. The volume of each transaction is limited to 20 units of A, but trading volume within a period is unlimited.
• Each period subjects can enter as many BIDs and ASKs (between 1 and 99) as they want – again without restrictions on
the LEFT and RIGHT market.
• IMPORTANT: The price of the currencies is set exclusively by you and the other subjects in the market by supply and
demand.
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After each trading period a history screen is shown for 10 s to provide you with information on what happened in the
arket:
ppendix B. Instruction for Treatment MM
ackground of the experiment
In this experiment on currency trading 8 human traders and 2 computerized market makers can trade currency A and
urrency B (B is the home currency) in two independent markets (called LEFT and RIGHT).
arket properties
Initial endowment: Half of the human traders start with 75 units A and 1500 units B, while the other half of the human
traders start with 25 units A and 4500 units B.
There are two markets where the currencies can be traded – markets LEFT and RIGHT.
On every market, one computerized market maker quotes sell and buy offers to which the currency A can be bought or
sold.
No interest is paid on any currency.
The prices in the two markets can deviate.undamental value of currency A
The fundamentally justiﬁed value – fundamental value need not equal the price – of currency A (expressed in units of
urrency B) is the value that would result from a full and fair analysis of the currency. In reality it depends on micro- and
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macroeconomic variables. In our market the fundamental value of A (expressed in units of B) is modelled as a stochastic
process:
FVk = FVk−1 · ek .
where FVk stands for the fundamental value in period k and k is a normally distributed random variable with a mean of zero
and a standard deviation of 5%. The fundamental value in the current period it thus the best estimate of the fundamental
value in the next period.
Information on the fundamental value of currency A
Each period each subject receives a private signal (SIGNAL) on the fundamental value of currency A (expressed in units of
currency B). This signal can be above or below the actual fundamental value with equal probability. Most signals are close to
the true fundamental value, as only an error term with an expected value of zero and a standard deviation of 2.5% is added
to the fundamental value.
Calculating total wealth
Your total wealth (expressed in units of B) is comprised of the value of your holdings in A (units of A multiplied by the
last price) plus the holdings of B. For valuing A the last price is used.
Wealth = (units A × price A)  + units B
If prices in the two markets deviate, the current price with the higher trading volume is used.
Important details
• Each trading period lasts 240 s, i.e. 4 min.
• The experiment lasts between 8 and 14 periods with equal termination probability in each period.
• Your payment in Euro depends on your total wealth at the end of the experiment. Your holdings of A will be valued at
their fundamental value (not price!) of the last period. The ﬁnal payment is calculated as follows:
Final wealth = (units A × fundamental value) + units B
Payment = Final wealth
400
Example: units A: 30, fundamental value of A: 70, units B: 3900.
Final wealth = (30 × 70) + 3900 = 6000Payment = 6000
400
= 15 Euro
The trading screen looks as follows:
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rading
All subjects can buy and sell currencies at any time. This can be done on the LEFT or RIGHT market – switching
between markets is free and causes no extra costs. Short selling (negative holdings) is possible up to an amount of
−100 A and −6.000 B. The volume of each transaction is limited to 20 units of A, but trading volume within a period is
unlimited.
The BIDs and ASKs are set exclusively by the 2 computerized market makers, who  are completely independent from each
other. Each computerized market maker quotes on average every 6 s a sell and buy offer simultaneously, whereas he
orientates his quotes on the last trading price.
IMPORTANT: The price of the currencies is set exclusively by you and the other subjects in the market by supply and
demand.After each trading period a history screen is shown for 10 s to provide you with information on what has happened in
he market:
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